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Racial Segregation and Cultural Domination: A Rubin
Trilogy on Title VII
Martha Chamallas*
The many tributes to Judge Rubin in this volume and from so many
other quarters attest to his reputation as a brilliant jurist, an incredibly
hard worker, an intellectual with wide-ranging interests and a man who
cared deeply about legal ethics. To this list, I would also add that Judge
Rubin had a reputation for being a "liberal" judge. As a political label,
liberalism is not much in fashion these days. Liberals are outnumbered
on the federal bench and are no longer able to shape legal doctrines
expansively to fulfill 1960s and 1970s ideals of equality and justice. The
liberal label is diffuse; I suspect that it can attach to any judge who
is not consistently pro-business or who, on occasion at least, is willing
to expand individual rights.
For this essay I read Judge Rubin's opinions on Title VII to see
whether the liberal label could be said to fit these opinions and, if it
did, to attempt to describe his individual brand of liberalism. Not
surprisingly, most of these Title VII cases involve procedural rulings
and fact-bound disputes that give little indication of the Judge's broader
substantive views. In a few significant cases, however, Judge Rubin
delved deeply into the record to uncover the specific pattern of racial
segregation presented in the case, and he offered a compelling inter-
pretation of Title VII to prohibit the denial of access suffered by the
plaintiff. These cases also illustrate that Judge Rubin had little patience
with employers who passed over qualified minority workers for no good
reason. To my mind, his willingness to question traditional patterns of
racial hierarchy in employment and to insist that employers take the
opportunity to diversify their workforces by hiring and promoting good
employees mark Rubin as liberal. The same liberal label may not fit
quite so well, however, when it comes to describing Rubin's views on
challenges to the legality of working conditions and the working envi-
ronment, rather than his response to complaints about lack of access
and maintenance of segregation.
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIW.
Professor of Law, University of Iowa; Associate Professor, L.S.U. Law Center
1976-81; J.D., L.S.U. Law Center, 1975.
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Historically the Fifth Circuit has been a very important site for the
development of anti-discrimination law.' The Fifth Circuit cases decided
in the first decade after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
held out the promise of an end to racial segregation and stratification
in the workplace.' Class actions attacking policies on hiring, promotion
and transfer "across the board," 3 judicial mistrust of subjective
procedures 4 and a presumption of discrimination in a high percentage
of individual cases' gave plaintiffs leverage to challenge longstanding
traditions of racial segregation. The challenge posed by these early cases
was cut short, however, by a retreat by the United States Supreme
Court starting in the late 1970s. By the 1980s, patterns of racial seg-
regation were more often defended in the courts as a product of choice
or custom, rather than as an artifact of discrimination. 6 The class action
had all but disappeared from the scene, 7 and high burdens of proof
had been imposed on plaintiffs trying to show either intentional
discrimination' or group-based adverse impact. 9 The focus of Title VII
changed from the creation of new opportunities through hiring, pro-
motion, and affirmative action to a far less ambitious emphasis on
1. Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform (1988); see, e.g., Jack Bass, Unlikely
Heroes (1981); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern
Jurisprudence of Employment Discrimination, 6 Industrial Rel. L.J. 313, 322-24, 340-44
(1984); Jerome M. Culp, A New Employment Policy for the 1980's: Learning From the
Victories and Defeats of Twenty Years of Title VII, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 895, 900-02
(1985).
2. Blumrosen describes this line of cases as a "southern jurisprudence" that was
"calculated to simplify the attack on segregated employment systems." Blumrosen, supra
note 1, at 340, 342. He regards the Fourth and Fifth Circuits as "particularly influential,"
in part because "[tlhe judges in the other circuits seemed to defer informally to their
counterparts in the south who had intimately experienced the relationship between racial
segregation and employment practices." Id. at 342.
3. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969).
4. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, -1255 (5th Cir. 1977); East
v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1975).
6. See Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job
Segregation, U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
7. See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1019-21 (1991).
8. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089
(1981) (burden of persuasion rests with plaintiff in disparate treatment cases).
9. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658, 109 S. Ct. 2115,
2125 (1989) (burden of proving lack of business justification rests with plaintiff in disparate
impact suit). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed this aspect of Wards Cove by placing
the burden on the employer to demonstrate "that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 105(a)(i) (codified in 42 U.S.C. 1981).
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curtailing dismissals and layoffs of protected groups.' 0 When they sur-
faced, liberal visions of equality were often submerged in dissents.
For this essay I have selected three Title VII cases that I believe
illustrate the contours and limits of Judge Rubin's liberalism on matters
of race and ethnicity in the workplace. They are part of this new
generation of Title VII cases, decided in the conservative 1980s and
1990s. The employers prevailed in each case, with Judge Rubin registering
two strong dissents in EEOC v. Kimbrough Investment Co.", and Hill
v. Mississippi State Employment Service. 2 However, in one case, Garcia
v. Gloor,3 Rubin wrote to uphold employer, prerogative in opposition
to the position taken by the EEOC.
Each of the cases deals with the legal concept of business need-
the level and type of justification that an employer must put forward
to overcome a showing of harm by a minority employee. In the em-
ployment discrimination area, business need is one of those basic con-
siderations that marks the terrain between lawful and unlawful practices.
Whether the claim is framed as one of intentional discrimination ("dis-
parate treatment") or unintentional discrimination ("disparate impact"),
the court's view of the reasonableness and efficacy of the employer's
practice is likely to affect the outcome.
The Rubin dissents in Kimbrough and Hill have a similar theme:
minority employees should not be prevented from attaining better jobs
simply because of traditional practices or informal ways of doing busi-
ness. In these cases, Rubin supported black plaintiffs seeking access to
white-dominated jobs because the defendants could not offer any sound
business reasons for their rejections. This absence of business need
prompted Rubin to find intentional disparate treatment in Hill4 and
unintentional disparate impact in Kimbrough.1' Unless it could be es-
tablished that perpetuation of traditional patterns was somehow good
for business, Rubin believed that Title VII required change.
In striking contrast, in Garcia v. Gloor, Rubin refused to require
an employer in Brownsville, Texas to supply a reason for its rule
forbidding employees to speak Spanish on the job. 16 The employer's
preference for English was honored, without a further showing of busi-
ness need. Questions of access and desegregation were not directly at
issue in Garcia because the workforce was predominantly Hispanic. Faced
with a claim centering on cultural domination rather than workplace
10. Donahue & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 984.
11. 703 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
12. 918 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1990).
13. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 51-90.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 17-50.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 91-123.
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demographics, Judge Rubin interpreted Title VII to support employer
demands for assimilation. Garcia stands opposed to most contemporary
"liberal" views of cultural diversity.
EEOC v. Kimbrough Investment Co.-Segregating by
Word of Mouth
Kimbrough was a class action challenging racial segregation at the
Biloxi Sheraton during the 1970s. The pattern at the Sheraton was a
familiar one: black employees were mostly relegated to servant/menial
jobs concentrated in the kitchen, housekeeping and the bellstand.' 7 Whites
held the jobs which called for more sustained contact with hotel guests
(front desk, bartender, cocktail waitress), or which required nonphysical
labor or the exercise of judgment ( security, office, sales, accounting,
maintenance)."8
The racial hierarchy was sustained largely by informal procedures.
Jobs were filled by word of mouth.' 9 Openings were not posted or
advertised and hiring was done by department supervisors on a subjective
basis.20 Except for two supervisors of black departments, all the super-
visors at the hotel were white.2 '
The only peculiar feature of this otherwise classic example of a
standardless, subjective selection process was a folder system, instituted
by the hotel four years after its opening.2 2 Under the folder system, a
white security guard was assigned to accept written application forms
from applicants, although there was still no posting or listing of va-
cancies. There was evidence that the guard sometimes used racial steering
to direct blacks to apply for jobs only in black departments or to
encourage them to list a job in a black department as their first choice.23
If applicants indicated that they would accept any job, their application
was placed in the "Anything" folder. 24
When the applications were forwarded to the front office, they were
placed in the folder corresponding only to the applicant's first choice.2"
17. EEOC v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
18. A snapshot of the workforce in 1974 indicated, for example, that of the twelve
departments at the hotel, eight were completely segregated and only two had more than
token integration. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9-10,
Kimbrough (Nos. 81-4429, 82-4043).
19. 703 F.2d at 104 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id. at 104 n.2 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 104 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
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Those persons who had not indicated a specific preference were out of
luck because applications in the Anything folder were never considered.
2 6
The strategy of the hotel was to explain away the pattern of seg-
regation on the basis of freedom of choice. In its brief to the Fifth
Circuit, the defendant argued that blacks "gravitated" to black de-
partments in part because they already knew people who worked in
those jobs,2" most notably the black chef employed at the Sheraton who
the hotel repeatedly referred to as a co-founder of the local NAACP."
Admitting that there were instances in which black employees possessed
the qualifications for jobs in white departments,29 the hotel nevertheless
insisted that blacks lacked interest in these jobs or should be presumed
to lack interest because they never applied. 0 The hotel's only justification
for the folder system was that it accommodated an applicant's prefer-
ence.3 It dismissed any harm to blacks caused by the hotel's failure to
consider the applicants in the Anything folder as insubstantial or un-
substantiated, in part because many of the applicants were not identified
by race.32
The hotel's explanations were accepted by the magistrate trying the
case and affirmed by a majority of the appellate panel. On appeal the
EEOC pointed to the disparate impact of the folder system, rather than
relying solely on a theory of classwide disparate treatment. 3  In ruling
for the hotel, however, the panel seemed most impressed by the mag-
istrate's conclusion that, under the folder system, whites and blacks
were treated the same.3 Pointing to the low percentages of blacks who
had applied for jobs in white departments, the majority concluded that
the hotel's employment practices were "rooted in legitimate business
reasons, '3 without relating any specific justification for the hotel's use
26. Id.
27. Brief of Kimbrough Investment Company at 17-18, Kimbrough (Nos. 81-4429,
82-4043).
28. Id. at 4-5, 22-23.
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id. at 21-22.
31. Id. at 26.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 44-45, Kimbrough
(Nos. 81-4429, 82-4043); Reply Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
at 6-7, Kimbrough (Nos. 81-4429, 82-4043).
34. 703 F.2d at 101 (quoting magistrate's finding that "the facts fail to indicate that
blacks were treated any differently than whites under the folder system"). In his dissent,
Rubin argued that this conclusion of no disparate treatment was irrelevant to plaintiff's
disparate impact claim. Id. at 105 (Rubin, J., dissenting). He also disputed the accuracy
of the conclusion, given the proof of racial steering by the guard administering the folder.
Id. at 104 (Rubin, J., dissenting).




of the folder system or for its disregard of applicants who made the
mistake of admitting that they were willing to accept anything.
Judge Rubin's dissent in Kimbrough is the kind of meticulous opin-
ion whose power to persuade comes from the care with which he
documents each statement with specifics from the record and his re-
markable ability to bring testimony to life by recounting the most telling
details of the patterns of segregation at the Sheraton. Rubin's opinion
provides us with an understanding of the subtleties of segregation in
the post-Civil Rights era.
In several revealing footnotes, Rubin summarized the testimony of
black employees to explain how people were discouraged from seeking
nontraditional jobs. In some instances, blacks were told that the only
openings were in black departments.3 6 This presented a problem for
someone who needed a job but preferred work in a white department:
the folder system provided no effective way for an employee to play it
safe by applying for a job in a black department, while simultaneously
indicating an active interest in vacancies in white departments. The failure
to post job vacancies also meant, of course, that there was no easy
way of verifying whether the word-of-mouth information black employees
received from those in charge of the folder was accurate. Not surpris-
ingly, blacks often found out about jobs only from other black employees
who knew of openings in black departments. 7 In this respect, the folder
system was a perfect complement to the word-of-mouth system because,
while it looked like a race-neutral general hiring procedure, blacks could
still not compete effectively with whites for jobs in white departments
without being told about vacancies or given encouragement to apply.
Rubin's dissent also detailed how the system at the hotel resulted
in the underemployment of black employees with special skills and
experience. One black applicant, for example, had training as a guard
in the military; he was never considered for the security guard vacancies
at the hotel, however, because he had listed "busboy" first on his
application. 38 Rubin's close reading of the record enabled him to expose
this cruel feature of a segregated system. I suspect that a common
reaction of hotel guests when they see "busboys" is to assume that the
reason these men are working in this low-ranking job is because they
lack the education or training for better jobs. When minorities occupy
low status jobs, this tends to reinforce cultural beliefs about minorities'
lack of qualifications and may prevent many people from recognizing
that job segregation is not inevitable. In his understated, facts-only
36. Id. at 104 n.2 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
37. Brief of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 50-51, Kimbrough (Nos.
81-4429, 82-4043).
38. 703 F.2d at 104 n.3 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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fashion, Rubin managed to dispel the validity of such a common as-
sumption and in the process to reveal something about the human cost
of racial segregation.
Rubin offered this picture of how segregation functioned at the
Sheraton by way of "background" or factual context for his analysis
of the specific issue of whether the folder system violated Title VII. At
the time Kimbrough was decided, the controlling Fifth Circuit precedent
placed the burden of proof on the employer in disparate impact cases
to show the business necessity of practices that excluded a dispropor-
tionate number of minority applicants.39 Because Rubin concluded that
the folder system played a role in the perpetuation of racially segregated
departments, he argued that the hotel was required to show a business
need for the system. He then recounted "every word of testimony" '4
by which the hotel sought to establish business necessity. The best the
hotel could offer was to explain that it would have been burdensome
to resort to more than one folder to find interested applicants. 4' It gave
no reason at all for its failure to select from the Anything folder. The
solution of having applicants fill out multiple application forms if they
were interested in more than one job was instituted only after the EEOC
filed suit.42 To Rubin's mind, this weak justification clearly failed to
meet the employer's burden; he concluded that the hotel had shown no





Rubin used his dissent in Kimbrough to fight a trend in Title VII
cases to conflate disparate treatment and disparate impact theories4 and
to water down the business necessity requirement in disparate impact
39. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 967, 103 S. Ct. 293 (1982). At that time, however, there was considerable debate
as to whether subjective procedures, as well as objective procedures, should be subjected
to disparate impact analysis and whether the plaintiff had the obligation to pinpoint the
specific practice or practices causing the impact. See Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has since made it clear that
subjective procedures may be challenged in a disparate impact case. Watson v. Ft. Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787 (1988). The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 provides that plaintiffs must identify the specific practice or practices causing the
disparate impact, unless "the elements of a respondent's [employer's] decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (1992).
40. 703 F.2d at 107 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 107 n.12 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. 703 F.2d at 107 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
44. See Hannah Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and
Burdine, 23 B.C. L. Rev. 419 (1982).
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suits.4 5 He stressed that if the issue in the case was the unjustified
disparate impact of the folder system, it did not matter that the system
had been instituted without discriminatory intent and that on its face
the folder system treated blacks and whites the same.4 One important
feature of disparate impact theory is that it dispenses with the need to
show intent at all when the harm is systemic, that is, when the plaintiff
shows adverse impact on blacks as a group.47 Rubin objected to the
magistrate's and to the panel majority's lapses into a rhetoric of intent,
betraying their resistance to such a non-intent-based system of liability.
Rubin also wanted to assure that the standard for rebutting a prima
facie case in disparate treatment cases-the articulation of a legitimate
business reason-did not become confused with the more stringent busi-
ness necessity standard.48
In his final analysis, however, Rubin concluded that the folder system
was invalid under either the lenient or the stringent test for business
need. Perhaps anticipating the troubled future of disparate impact lit-
igation, he argued that the plaintiff was entitled to win under disparate
treatment standards. The fact that the employer regarded the folder
system as convenient was not equivalent to an articulation of an adequate
business rationale for the system. Rubin maintained that "even were
business reason enough, there is no evidence in the record to support
the existence of any business reason for this separation of departments
by race save the fact that 'it had always been done this way.' That
traditional consideration is not a legitimate business reason." ' 49
Because Rubin regarded the folder system as one of the ways that
segregation was actively maintained by the hotel, he was not willing to
credit the explanation that segregation was simply a reflection of the
choices made by minority applicants. For the panel majority, segregation
at the hotel was voluntary, reflecting a preference by minority workers
for black departments. The majority was neither willing to presume
discrimination from the fact of segregation, nor to look very closely at
the hiring practices to discover the interrelationship between actual job
preferences and specific hiring practices. In contrast, Rubin looked for
an explanation for segregation in the structures and procedures of the
hotel and was not willing to presume that blacks were satisfied with
45. See Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate
Standards, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 376 (1981).
46. 703 F.2d at 105 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
47. See Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Dis-
parate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
305, 334-43 (1983).
48. 703 F.2d at 106-07 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 106 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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their traditional place in the employment hierarchy. The hotel's casual
disregard for the expression of interest of those applicants who were
willing to take "Anything" troubled Rubin, perhaps because he realized
that segregation was resilient and that not much would change in the
absence of legal incentives. Rubin's final point in Kimbrough eloquently
emphasized the need for an expansive interpretation of Title VII: "We
must require the removal of even those walls created by the paper-thin
layers of a file folder that become impenetrable racial barriers." ' 0
Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Service-
Segregating by Negligence
Hill was not a typical race segregation case. The defendant in Hill
was a state employment agency, rather than an employer. The claim
was that the agency discriminated against Hazel Hill, a black applicant,
by failing to refer her to jobs for which she was qualified. I consider
Hill to be about racial segregation, however, because the essence of
Hill's claim was that the agency steered her into jobs that were pre-
dominately and stereotypically black and denied her opportunities for
higher-paying integrated employment.
Unlike so many individual claims of employment discrimination,
Hill's claim was well developed by her attorneys from the Southeast
Mississippi Legal Services. She was able to document specific instances
in which the agency failed to refer her for a job at the same time it
referred white applicants, many of whom had less experience than Hill.5'
Hill also gathered extensive statistical data about the pattern of referrals
by the agency.52
The agency followed a complicated, partly subjective process of
matching applicants to available openings. Every applicant was given a
code based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that reflected the
applicant's job preferences. 3 Often, however, applicants were referred
out of code, and the referral clerk was under no strict obligation to
refer all applicants with the appropriate code. 4 Referrals might be based
on the clerk's assessment of such factors as the applicant's attitude,
appearance, personality, or employment history. The records also re-
vealed that the agency sometimes referred fewer applicants than the
number requested by the employer.5 6
50. Id. at 108 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
51. Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 n.5, 1242-
43 (5th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 1236-38.
53. Id. at 1235.
54. Id. at 1236.
55. Id. at 1235.
56. Id. at 1237.
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Hill was interested in finding a job as a cashier or waitress, primarily
because those jobs typically paid more than the minimum wage Hill
received when she worked as a counter-attendant for fast food chains . 5
Her case was based on both statistical data and on specific instances
of disparate treatment based on race. Hill's expert analyzed the data
on referrals from the agency's computer and found statistically significant
differences between white and black referrals for the codes relating to
waitress, cocktail waitress and cashier jobs. 5 The agency's expert con-
tested the significance of the analysis, however, because the data did
not control for qualifications and there was no way to discover this
information for the large numbers of cases involved. 9 However, even
defendant's experts conceded that after controlling for qualifications,
the racial disparities would not likely disappear, although the magnitude
of the disparity might decrease. 60
The uncontested evidence was directly related to Hill: she proved
that the agency failed to refer her for four desirable jobs for which
she was qualified. 61 The details of these incidents were telling. In one
case, the agency referred twenty-two whites for a cashier job and no
black applicants. Several of the whites were referred out of code and
several lacked the requisite experience or education.62 At this time, Hill
was referred only for jobs as a housekeeper and counter attendant. 61
Just after filing the complaint on behalf of Hill, Legal Services even
sent a "tester," a white woman attorney, to the agency seeking referral
for waitress jobs. The tester was referred to two jobs, even though Hill
had been told that same day by another clerk that there were no waitress
positions available.6
The result in Hill is surprising; Hill lost even though she proved a
great portion of her factual case. Both the magistrate and the panel
majority agreed that the four instances of failure to refer established a
prima facie case of discrimination. The majority held, however, that
the agency adequately rebutted the inference of intentional discrimination
by asserting that Hill's treatment resulted from the general inefficiency
of its referral system.6 The panel majority accepted the agency's ex-
planation that Hill's harm was likely caused by employee oversight, or
a failure to communicate among staff or an inability to contact the
57. Id. at 1242 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1237.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1237, 1240, 1243.
61. Id. at 1235-36 n.5, 1242-43.
62. Id. at 1242 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Rubin, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1243 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1239.
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relevant people, in short, by "inefficiencies inherent in a large, heavily-
utilized, bureaucratic, and undermanned system with limited resources.""6
Once employer negligence was counted as a legitimate business reason
to rebut the inference of discrimination, Hill was left with her statistical
case to show that the agency's explanation was pretextual. Because the
majority believed that the unrefined statistics were not enough to prove
"pretext, ' 67 it affirmed the judgment for the agency. While stating that
it did not condone inefficiency, the majority thought that it would be
"the height of unfairness" 6 to infer discrimination from the fact of
negligent mistreatment of minority applicants.
I would describe Judge Rubin's dissent as that of controlled rage.
His opinion made it clear that he had little tolerance for lack of care,
particularly on the part of government employees. He viewed the em-
ployees at the agency as putting up a "united front" 69 to protect their
employer from liability, ironically claiming that it was their negligence
and inefficiency that produced Hill's injuries. Rubin was simply not
willing to let the agency off the hook by pointing to the ineptitude of
its employees:
The Mississippi State Employment Service is not a disembodied
entity on high that functions independently of its employees. It
is itself the deus ex machina that puts the actors on the stage
and directs them. The allegedly inefficient, regulation-hamstrung,
overworked employees whom it has hired and through whom it
functions are the MSES. It may not wash its hands of the spots,
whether damned or merely discriminatory, by which their actions
have stained the MSES.70
Rubin was also very skeptical of the neutrality of the actions of the
agency employees, inefficient or otherwise. He began his analysis with
the proposition that subjective selection processes tend to facilitate dis-
crimination. 7' Besides general assertions of problems in its operations,
the agency offered no comparative evidence of instances when black
applicants had been referred over more qualified (or equally qualified)
white applicants. Rubin found the agency's excuses unpersuasive and
unbelievable and expressed his point aptly, using the example of a
cashier, the job that Hill was denied:
The coincidence of such employee error consistently operating
to the detriment of Hill strains credulity. A cashier may some-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1240.
68. Id. at 1239.
69. Id. at 1243 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1241 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1243 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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times be "short," that is, she may sometimes turn in less cash
than her register records, but if this is due to error, then she
ought also, at least on some occasions, to be "over," having
more cash than the register records. There is reason to suspect
the employee who is always short and never over.72
A striking feature of Rubin's dissent in Hill, like his dissent in
Kimbrough, is his ability to explain the cultural significance of the
evidence and his careful attention to the record. The majority buried
in a footnote the critical evidence of Hill's treatment on those four
specific occasions in which she was not referred for jobs. 7 Rubin fully
described each incident in the text of his opinion 4 and showed how the
agency's treatment of Hill was harmful. In particular, Rubin would not
accept at face value the agency's defense that it had caused Hill little
harm because it had referred her to "alternative positions" during the
same time period. Showing that he understood the intricate workings
of racial segregation in Mississippi, Judge Rubin explained that these
alternative positions were all "stereotypical for black persons in the deep
south." 75 In one passage Rubin translated the cultural meaning of the
agency's referrals, noting that Hill had been referred to a "motel as a
'housekeeper,' a euphemism for a maid; to two fast-food chains, Church's
and Kentucky Fried Chicken as a 'cashier,' and to another as a counter
helper. These were in effect jobs making beds or serving fried chicken." 7 6
With this short discussion, Rubin was able to convey that racial seg-
regation in employment is not only a matter of simple economics, but
also implicates the right of minorities to escape confining stereotypes
destructive of their individual dignity and subjectivity.
For legal support of his view that Hill had been treated unfairly,
Rubin offered a straightforward, yet innovative, interpretation of Title
VII in cases of individual disparate treatment. In these cases, the de-
fendant's burden on rebuttal is to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason" for its actions.7 7 Rubin argued that the term "legitimate"
should mean more than simply non-criminal or not forbidden by law. 78
To justify a discriminatory effect in individual cases, Rubin would require
a showing of business justification that fits the purposes of Title VII:
"A legitimate reason must be in some degree related to job efficiency,
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1235-36 n.5.
74. Id. at 1242-43 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1242 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.
Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802,
93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973)).
78. 918 F.2d at 1243 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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the employer's needs, or the applicant's qualifications." 7 9 It would not
be enough, for example, for an employer like the agency in Hill to
defend simply by alleging a lack of racial animus, if the practice made
no business sense.
Rubin's definition of "legitimate reason" treats workers and em-
ployers as if they are engaged in a common enterprise and share common
interests. Quoting from the leading Supreme Court case, McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,0 Rubin emphasized that, under Title VII,
"[t]he broad overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and
consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions.""1 This common
interest in fairness and efficiency is not served by malfeasance and
negligence. To allow the employer to defend by proving its own neg-
ligence assumes that only employers are truly interested in efficiency.
Rubin believed this to be false and argued that "[tihe need for efficiency
constitutes a defense in disparate-treatment cases. It would be ironic if
the employer's claim of its own inefficiency also served as a defense.''82
Not many cases have considered this threshold question of what
constitutes a "legitimate" reason for purposes of rebutting a case of
disparate treatment.8 3 A narrow interpretation of Title VII would prohibit
only decisions in which the employee could prove that the employer
actively desired the harm because of racial animus. The labeling of
disparate treatment as a form of "intentional" discrimination has en-
couraged some courts to read "legitimate" as mere surplusage, adding
nothing to the requirement that the employer's action not be specifically
motivated by racial bias." In one case,"5 for example, the employer
admitted that it did not even consider the minority plaintiff for a job
because it had unlawfully pre-selected another employee for the post.
The court found no Title VII violation, however, because the defendant
79. Id. at 1244 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
80. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
81. 918 F.2d at 1244 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. at 801, 93 S. Ct. at 1823).
82. Id. at 1244 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
83. Commentators addressing the issue have taken differing positions. Compare Mack
A. Player, Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences
as a Talisman for Analysis, 36 Mercer L. Rev. 855, 877-78 (1985) (arbitrary or irrational
reasons are not "legitimate") with Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the
Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 43 Hastings L. Rev. 59, 139 (1991) ("legitimate" reason "should include any
nondiscriminatory reason upon which the employer in fact relied").
84. See Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 750 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated,
798 F.2d 532 (1st Cir. 1986); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir.
1979).
85. Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1980).
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was not thinking about the plaintiff's ethnicity when it violated its hiring
rules.
Rubin's approach in Hill would impose liability in cases in which
segregation or other kinds of racially marked harms are caused or
maintained by employer negligence. Although such a cause of action
for negligent discrimination has yet to be recognized by the courts, s6
there is nothing in the text or legislative history of Title VII to prevent
this development. Endorsement of disparate impact theory demonstrates
that a showing of discriminatory motivation is not the only way to
prove actionable discrimination. The recent affirmation of a cause of
action for sexual harassment 7 also suggests that courts are sometimes
willing to find Title VII violations, even if supervisors or other employees
sincerely believe that they harbor no hostility or ill will toward the
people they offend. Title VII allows considerable room for judicial
creativity, as the sharp shifts in interpretation of the statute in the recent
past so well illustrate.
Admittedly, the Rubin approach to disparate treatment goes against
the current conservative grain. It is reminiscent of early Fifth Circuit
precedent, notably East v. Romine, Inc.,ss which required employers in
disparate treatment cases to show that the person they selected was
better qualified than the black plaintiff. The reasoning in these early
cases was that unless the employer could make such a showing, there
was no compelling reason why the court should not further the goal of
Title VII by encouraging the advancement of qualified minority workers.
When the Supreme Court in 1981 rejected Romine and finally allocated
the burden of persuasion in individual disparate treatment cases to the
plaintiff,89 it gave employers the right to make mistakes about the relative
qualifications of employees competing for jobs without facing automatic
liability. This allocation also made it extremely difficult for minority
employees to prevail in the absence either of direct evidence of discrim-
inatory attitudes or a track record of selecting demonstrably less qualified
nonminority employees for the same job.
Rubin's limitation of "legitimate" to job-related reasons is faithful
to the Supreme Court's allocation of burdens of proof, but does not
86. 1 am indebted to my colleague, Jean Love, for this important observation about
the limits of Title VII liability. Love questions the soundness of permitting a form of
strict liability via disparate impact, yet denying a cause of action for individual disparate
treatment produced by employer negligence. At least one court has allowed recovery in
such a negligence context. See Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d 793 (1 th
Cir. 1988).
87. See generally Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399
(1986).
88. 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975).
89. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct.
1089 (1981).
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let the employer escape an evaluation of its selection processes altogether
by preemptively admitting that its actions are bad for business. Most
importantly, I believe that Rubin's approach takes into account the
perspective of the minority employee.9 To qualify as legitimate, the
reason must be one that would be acceptable to a reasonable employee
who shared the assessment of the underlying facts. It is no consolation
for employees to discover that they lost out on a job because they were
completely overlooked or because the employer used an arbitrary pro-
cedure. When the agency in Hill failed to notify the plaintiff of availablejob prospects and the hotel in Kimbrough disregarded the applicants in
the Anything folder, their inaction signaled that the interests of minority
employees had very low priority. Even if it would not change the result
in many cases, Rubin's interpretation of Title VII affirms the judgment
that it is unfair and unwise to impede the advancement of minority
employees when there is no possible benefit to be gained. His approach
gives higher priority to ending racial segregation and racial hierarchy in
employment and is more responsive to the perspective of minority work-
ers.
Garcia v. Gloor-Language, Cultural Identity
and Employer Prerogative
Unfortunately, the Title VII opinion by Judge Rubin most often
reprinted in casebooks 9 does not illustrate his approach to racial seg-
regation. Being one of the few cases to confront an English-only rule,
Garcia v. Gloor 92 stands as strong support for an employer's preroga-
tive-even in the absence of business need-to prohibit bilingual em-
ployees from speaking Spanish on the job.
Garcia involved a charge of unlawful discharge in violation of Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Hector Garcia, the plaintiff, worked as a salesman for a lumber supply
90. The issue of perspective is becoming increasingly important in employment dis-
crimination law, particularly in cases challenging hostile work environments. See Martha
Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and
Racial Harassment Litigation, I Texas J. of Women & the Law 95 (1992). Perhaps the
fullest elaboration of the significance of perspective in legal disputes is Martha Minow,
Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1990). See also Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 2320 (1989).
91. See, e.g., James E. Jones, Jr., William P. Murphy & Robert Belton, Discrimination
in Employment 430-35 (5th ed. 1987); Michael J. Zimmer, Charles A. Sullivan & Richard
F. Richards, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 334-39 (1982).
92. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). The original opinion, also in support of the employer,
was withdrawn. Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1980). Some significant changes
to the text were made in the final version. See infra note 104.
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store in Brownsville, Texas. Born in the United States of Mexican
ancestry, Garcia was completely fluent in both English and Spanish. 9a
He regarded Spanish as his primary language, however, and always
spoke Spanish in his home. 94
Garcia was fired for violating Gloor's rule against speaking Spanish. 95
The rule required employees to speak English except when they were
waiting on Spanish-speaking customers or during work breaks. The
incident which most immediately prompted the firing was Gloor's over-
hearing Garcia respond in Spanish to a question from another Mexican-
American salesman. Garcia also admitted that he violated the English-
only rule frequently" and testified that he found the rule difficult to
follow. 97
The lumber supply store was located in a community that was 75%
Hispanic.9" Most of the employees at Gloor were Hispanic (31 out of
39), 99 including the group of salesmen (7 out of 8).10 Gloor nevertheless
took the position that there were valid business reasons for the English-
only rule. He argued that English-speaking customers objected to com-
munications they could not understand and that supervisors who did
not speak Spanish could better oversee subordinates who were required
to speak English.' 0' Gloor also claimed that the English-only rule en-
couraged employees to improve their English and helped to assure that
they could understand trade publications printed only in English. 02
Judge Rubin's opinion for a unanimous panel found no discrimi-
nation, without ever reaching the question of the adequacy or plausibility
of Gloor's arguments about business need. The critical move in Rubin's
analysis was his judgment that requiring Hispanic employees to speak
English had no disparate impact on that group and could not be said
to raise an inference of intentional discrimination. Rubin saw no link
to a prohibited classification and thus was able to dismiss any harm
produced by the English-only rule as something other than discrimi-
nation. Because he believed that Garcia had failed to establish a prima
93. 618 F.2d at 266, 268.
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id. Garcia was actually a mixed motivation case. Gloor claimed that Garcia's
firing was also due to job-related deficiencies, such as failing to keep his inventory current
and replenish his stock. However, Judge Rubin assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that
violation of the English-only rule was a substantial factor in Garcia's termination. Id. at
268.
96. Id. at 267.
97. Id. at 266.
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facie case, Rubin placed himself in the uncharacteristic position of
arguing that, even if wholly arbitrary, the policy was nevertheless lawful
under Title VII: "The EEO Act does not prohibit all arbitrary em-
ployment practices. It does not forbid employers to hire only persons
born under a certain sign of the zodiac or persons having long hair or
short hair or no hair at all. It is directed only at specific impermissible
bases of discrimination-race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 0 3
Rubin reasoned that, on its face, the English-only rule did not
discriminate on the basis of national origin' °4 and focused on whether
the language requirement was a form of indirect or covert discrimination.
There was little question that the impact of the rule fell disproportion-
ately on persons whose primary language was Spanish rather than Eng-
lish, the majority of whom were Mexican-Americans. The EEOC argued
for a straightforward application of disparate impact theory that would
require Gloor to prove business necessity. 105 To avoid this result,' however,
Rubin carved out an exception to the application of disparate impact
for rules "that the affected employee can readily observe and nonob-
servance is a matter of individual preference."'' 06 When applied to Garcia,
the new "mutable condition" exception meant that his fluency in English
prevented the negative impact of the rule from being recognized as
legally relevant. Rubin did not regard the English-only rule as a hardship
for bilingual employees, nor did he believe that it produced an atmos-
phere of ethnic oppression. That Garcia was prevented from exercising
his language preference was said to be "related more closely to the
employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of op-
portunity."'107 In a footnote,1'8 Rubin indicated that he recognized some
difficulty with this analysis. The mutable condition exception bore an
uncomfortable resemblance to the discredited line of "sex plus" cases' °9
103. Id. at 269.
104. In the final opinion, Rubin concluded that "In]either the statute nor common
understanding equates national origin with the language that one chooses to speak." Id.
at 268. In the withdrawn opinion, Rubin took the more extreme position that Garcia's
national origin could not be Mexican because he was born in the United States. Garcia
v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 1980).
105. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 270.
107. Id. at 269 (quoting Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d
1084, 1091 (1975)).
108. Id. at 269-70 n.6.
109. The term "sex-plus" was coined by Judge Brown in dissent in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) in which a Fifth Circuit panel upheld a ban on hiring mothers
with pre-school age children. 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969). The ruling was subsequently
reversed by the Supreme Court. 400 U.S. 542, 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971). For a discussion of
the history of the sex-plus doctrine, see Martha Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spec-
trum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female
Jobs, 1984 Univ. of Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9-17.
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that had attempted to limit Title VII's protection only to rules which
applied to all women (excluding, for example, discrimination against
subgroups of married women or women with preschool age children).
Even the landmark disparate impact case-Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 1"0
had involved scrutiny of a mutable condition. In theory, the high school
education requirement struck down in Griggs posed no insuperable ob-
stacle for minority employees, especially since the employer in Griggs
had a special program to help finance the costs of education for its
minority employees."' Without further analysis, Rubin recognized the
apparent inconsistency and simply stated that some mutable conditions
are forms of "disguised discrimination either in intent or effect.""'
It is likely that Rubin regarded the English-only rule as a barrier
of a different magnitude than the high school education requirement in
Griggs. He may have believed that it was easy for Garcia to comply
with the rule and keep his job, compared to the burden of obtaining
a high school diploma imposed on the employees at Duke Power. This
assumes, of course, that compliance with an English-only rule is hard
only for persons who are not completely fluent in English. It does not
take into account the cultural meaning of the rule or any harm stemming
from subordination of ethnic group members who resist assimilation.
Further, although this point is not explicitly mentioned in the opin-
ion, the existence of the English-only rule likely had no "bottom line"
effect" 3 of reducing the percentage of Hispanic employees at the lumber
supply store below that of the surrounding geographic area. From the
statistics given, it appeared that defendant's workforce was neither dis-
proportionately Anglo nor ethnically stratified. The rule operated only
to shape the working environment and did not significantly affect the
demographics at the workplace.
110. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
111. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970).
112. 618 F.2d at 269-70 n.6. Rubin gives the example of a rule forbidding smoking
on the job, which he argues would be lawful even if it could be proven that "most of
the employees of one race smoke, most of the employees of another do not and it is
more likely that a member of the race more addicted to tobacco would be disciplined."
Id. at 270. Presumably, such an anti-smoking rule would not be "disguised discrimination
in effect," despite its adverse impact, because employees can choose not to smoke on
the job. It is unclear whether Rubin's mutable condition exception would also apply to
race specific policies. Under Rubin's analysis, for example, a ban on smoking applying
only to African-American employees could be upheld, provided the employer harbored
no racial animus toward the group, e.g., a black-owned business with a stated concern
for the shorter life expectancy of African-Americans.
113. When Garcia was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether
employers could defend against charges of disparate impact by claiming that their work
forces were racially balanced, the so-called "bottom line" defense. The Court subsequently
rejected the defense in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
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Rubin also had to answer Garcia's contention that the rule was
invalid under disparate treatment analysis as intentional discrimination
against Hispanics. Garcia argued that persons whose primary language
was English were granted a privilege to converse in that language, a
privilege that was denied to Garcia and other Hispanic employees." 4
The question was whether language was closely enough linked to national
origin in this case to raise an inference of covert disparate treatment.
An expert witness called by the plaintiff testified that "the Spanish
language is the most important aspect of ethnic identification for Mex-
ican-Americans, and it is to them what skin color is to others."" 5 By
focusing on the importance of language to cultural identity, Garcia
challenged the neutrality of the English-only rule which privileged not
only those persons fluent in English, but those persons whose cultural
identity was affirmed by establishing English as the norm in the work-
place. Assuming that the rule served no business need, it functioned
primarily as a cultural marker to indicate that Gloor Lumber was an
Anglo business even if the vast majority of the employees and customers
were Hispanic. From Garcia's perspective, there was no salient difference
between such a rejection of Mexican-American cultural life and the kind
of ethnic animus more widely acknowledged as prejudice.
While he did not totally dismiss the link between language and
cultural identity, Rubin denied it legal significance, again relying on the
notion of "choice" to delegitimate the injury to Garcia. Rubin insisted
that
the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is by definition a matter of choice. ...
[Garcia's] argument thus reduces itself to a contention
that the statute permits employees, to speak the tongue they
prefer. We do not think the statute permits this interpretation,
whether the preference be slight or strong or even one closely
related to self-identity."16
For Rubin, some degree of cultural assimilation or suppression of cultural
identity was expected of employees. Those persons who might be fired
for their failure to conform were seen as casualties of their own choices
rather than victims of an exclusionary workplace culture.
Similar to the problem of deciding which mutable conditions are
disguised forms of discrimination, the disparate treatment analysis in
Garcia raises the question of how much assimilation will be required
114. 618 F.2d at 268.
115. Id. at 267.
116. Id. at 270.
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of minority employees before cultural domination will be classified as
discrimination. Even those prohibited classifications under Title VII,
such as race and sex, commonly thought to be immutable, are also
social constructions. Perceptions and responses related to race and sex,
not race and sex in some essentialist sense, have a profound impact on
people's lives. To take an extreme example, suppose that a white em-
ployer required a light-skinned black employee to hide her racial identity
when interacting with white customers. The reason given is that white
customers in this enterprise feel more comfortable dealing with persons
of their own race and that the business would like to maintain its image
as a white business. I cannot imagine that Judge Rubin would have
regarded the employee's refusal to hide her identity as simply a "choice"
she made or that he would have concluded that the employer could fire
her without violating Title VII. If my speculation is correct, some concept
other than immutability is needed to explain the difference in result..
The example shows that even skin color can be mutable, and, like the
use of language, is merely culturally identified with race, not "race"
itself. 1 7 We are still left with the question of precisely when the affir-
mation of cultural identity becomes an infringement on employer pre-
rogative, rather than a protected expression of cultural diversity in the
workplace.
My analysis leads me to believe that there is no escaping a qualitative
judgment about just how important speaking Spanish is to Mexican-
Americans and whether an employer ought to be required to justify an
English-only rule. Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Gutierrez v. Municipal
Court,"' rejected Garcia and enjoined a similar English-only requirement
enacted by a judicial district of the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Using
a disparate impact analysis, the court stressed the close and important
relationship between language and identity and took a hard look at the
117. Paulette Caldwell has recently argued that the scope of legal protection ought to
depend more on "historical and sociocultural associations with race or gender," rather
than concepts of immutability. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365, 387. She reasons that "stereotypes
arise most often not from immutable traits but from negative associations with those
traits. These associations are used to reinforce the notion that individuals and groups
possessing such traits are intellectually, morally, and culturally inferior to members of
the dominant group. Antidiscrimination law should be, and at its best is, directed toward
the behavioral manifestations of such negative associations, not to line drawing based on
fixed, immutable, and outmoded conceptions of race or gender." Id. See also Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 Yale L.J. 1329 (1991).
118. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), vacated, 490 U.S. 1016, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989) (on
grounds of mootness).
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reasons given by the employer to support its rule." 9 When so exposed
to judicial scrutiny, the reasons looked more like suspicions and ex-
pressions of fear about a minority group rather than legitimate business
reasons. Thus, for example, the court discussed why the speaking of
Spanish might have "unnerved" non-Spanish speaking supervisors by
noting that "[u]nfortunately, monolingual persons may be threatened
by the speaking of a language they themselves cannot speak."' 120 It also
refused to validate the rule solely to assuage the fears of non-Spanish
speaking employees that Hispanics were using Spanish to talk behind
their backs, in the absence of proof that Spanish had actually been used
as a device to conceal the substance of conversations. 2 ' Underlying the
court's analysis in Gutierrez is an assumption that English is not nec-
essarily the exclusive or normal language in the workplace and that
ignorance of Spanish, like other lack of abilities, can sometimes produce
negative effects. Rather than focus solely on the Hispanic employee's
choice not to speak English, the opinion implicitly teaches that mon-
olingual employees have also chosen not to learn Spanish. In this context,
what becomes important is the relationship among employees from dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds and how to respect their specific cultural
identities and still run the business efficiently.
In contrast to Kimbrough and Hill, Judge Rubin was unwilling in
Garcia to insist that practices which harm minority employees be dis-
carded unless they serve a business need. I suspect that he did not
regard the partial suppression of cultural identity as the same sort of
harm as the racial segregation of jobs. In the decade that has passed
since the ruling in Garcia, there has been increasing criticism of assim-
ilation as the only model for anti-discrimination law 22 and more sustained
efforts to redefine legal harms from the perspective of the victim. 23
Because this is a time in which "multiculturalism" figures prominently
in so many discussions, it is easier now to find words to describe the
119. 838 F.2d at 1038-1045. After Garcia was decided, the EEOC published guidelines
dealing specifically with English-only rules. They permit limited English-only rules only
if the rule is justified by business necessity. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1991). Although EEOC
Guidelines are not binding on the courts, they often give them great deference. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 431, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2378 (1975).
120. 838 F.2d at 1042 n.15.
121. Id. at 1042.
122. Perhaps the most highly developed challenges have come from feminist scholars
and litigators who have resisted legal standards implicity premised on male experiences
and perspectives. They emphasize that women's differences from men should not serve
as justification for unfavorable treatment and are skeptical that a denial of gender
difference will produce justice for women. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing
Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
123. See supra note 90.
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harm suffered by Hector Garcia when he was forced to comply with
the English-only rule. This tends to strengthen the case for imposing
liability under Title VII, both under a disparate treatment and disparate
impact framework.
In her recent book, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 24 Iris
Young, a political philosopher, offers a rich description of the concept
of oppression that is useful for reexamining Title VII doctrine. Two
aspects of oppression-which she calls "exploitation" and "cultural
imperialism"-provide a theoretical frame for the kinds of discrimination
at issue in Kimbrough and Hill on the one hand and in Garcia on the
other.
Young's notion of exploitation helps to describe the phenomenon
of racial segregation. According to Young, exploitation consists of the
"steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social
group to benefit another."' 23 She explains how exploitation works so
that "the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain
and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves.' 1 26 Of particular
relevance to Title VII law, Young regards the category of menial labor
in this country as a racially specific form of exploitation. Young's
concept of menial labor very closely resembles the system of racial
segregation Rubin exposed in Kimbrough and Hill: "In our society there
remains strong cultural pressure to fill servant jobs-bellhop, porter,
chambermaid, busboy, and so on-with Black and Latino workers. These
jobs entail a transfer of energies whereby the servers enhance the status
of the served.'
'27
Because Young perceives that both the actual phenomenon of seg-
regation and its offensive character are sustained by culture, there is
no clear line for her between job segregation and stratification and other
forms of oppression, notably what she calls "cultural imperialism." By
so stressing the cultural meaning of racial segregation, Young is able
to connect it to oppression imposed through offensive working condi-
tions, like the policy challenged in Garcia. This is a connection that
Judge Rubin did not explore.
By cultural imperialism, Young means "the universalization of a
dominant group's experience and culture, and its establishment as the
norm." '' 2 This form of oppression renders the cultural identities of
minority groups suspect because it allows dominant groups to "project
their own experience as representative of humanity as such.' 1 29 Perhaps
124. Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).
125. Id. at 49.
126. Id. at 50.
127. Id. at 52.
128. Id. at 59.
129. Id.
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the most familiar example of this kind of oppression involves the his-
torical exclusion of pregnancy as a medical condition entitling pregnant
workers to sick and disability benefits and leaves. Because pregnant
workers were viewed as deviating from the tacit norm of the male
worker, their disability was regarded as qualitatively different from the
medical conditions affecting male workers and was used to justify dis-
missals and other employment losses.
The concept of cultural imperialism can also be used to analyze the
legal issue in Garcia. Thus one reason English-only rules are tolerated
may be that the English language and Anglo-American culture are thought
to be generically American, rather than merely one culturally specific
form of American culture. Exposing the cultural specificity of the norm
makes it possible to argue that there ought to be reasons other than
tradition to support the norm, for if the norm is not supported by good
business reasons, it serves only as a form of cultural domination.
There is still a great reluctance on the part of courts to find
discrimination unless policies directly deny minorities access to better
jobs. Only fairly recently have there been numerous rulings declaring
that patterns of harassment and violence create hostile working envi-
ronments in violation of Title VII. 130 It is difficult to mount a successful
challenge to other less dramatic forms of cultural domination. In the
1990s, however, there is now available a body of theoretical work that
supports expanding the definition of discrimination beyond a narrow,
purely economic concept. It is also apparent that entrenched patterns
of segregation are sustained by a complicated network of forces which
will not be disconnected simply by guaranteeing formal legal access.
By finally enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 over the strong
resistance of President Bush, 3 ' Congress expressed its confidence that
the courts could still play an important role in eliminating systemic
discrimination in the workplace. The case most responsible for provoking
the Congressional action- Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio'3 2-in-
volved old-style racial segregation of the sort that Judge Rubin was so
good at exposing and so astute in offering workable legal standards
130. For analyses of cases involving sexually hostile environments see Susan Estrich,
Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 839-47 (1991); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination
and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183,, 1197-1220 (1989).
131. For discussions of the history behind the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Michael
J. Zimmer, Charles A. Sullivan & Richard F. Richards, Cases and Materials on Em-
ployment Discrimination, Professors' Update (Spring 1992); Lex K. Larson, Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (1992).
132. 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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aimed at its elimination. It saddens me to realize that we will not hear
the voice of Judge Rubin interpret the new civil rights legislation. In
this next important period of enforcement of anti-discrimination laws,
we sorely need the wisdom of great liberal judges like Judge Rubin to
help create a new vision of equal opportunity, a vision that recognizes
a cultural as well as an economic dimension of discrimination.
